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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 15753 
AARON LEE GREUBER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in Juvenile Court with eleven 
offenses of a serious and felonious nature including 
first degree murder, aggravated assault, aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery (R. p.5-6) .* A waiver 
hearing was held before the Second District Juvenile 
Court, and appellant was certified for criminal pro-
ceedings in the Third District Court. There, appellant 
was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated 
robbery. This appeal is from the certification order 
and the subsequent conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a full hearing, the juvenile court waived 
its jurisdiction and ordered that appellant be trans-
ferred for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
h Th . d District Court record, *Citations to R. refer to t e ir 
District court No. 30855; citations to Tr. refer to the 
Juvenile court Transcript. 
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Appellant was tried in the district court and convicted 
of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the juvenile court's 
order for certification and the district court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with appellant's state-
ment of facts with the following exception and additions: 
The final sentence of appellant's statement of 
facts reads: "No other alternatives for treatment has 
[sic] been attempted with this juvenile.•• (Appellant's 
Brief,p. 2). In making this statement appellant alleges 
that only probation and "a stay on a boys' ranch" were 
used to deal with him. However, the record discloses 
many attempts to use the juvenile system to reform 
appellant. 
Probation was tried twice (Tr. p. 45), both times 
unsuccessfully (Tr. p. 53). Appellant was sent to two 
boys' ranches (Tr. p. 45-46), the second of which he 
ran away from refusing to return (Tr. P. 49). Appellant's 
probation counselor established a special school program 
for appellant (Tr. p. 46). Appellant was uncooperative 
so individual tutoring was arranged (Tr. p. 46). However, 
appellant's lack of motivation and poor attitude resulted 
in failure of this program as well (Tr. p. 46). 
-2-
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Appellant was place::1in detention twice (Tr. p. 48, 
S2), and he underwent a psychological evaluation (Tr. p. 47). 
These attempts proved futile and the Youth Development 
Center was suggested (Tr. p. S2). However, the author-
ities agreed that the Youth Development Center would 
not be of any value in this situation (Tr. p. S4-SS, 
S7, 114-llS). 
In addition, appellant and his family were 
assisted through a counseling program (Tr. p. 46). 
However, appellant was again uncooperative (Tr. p. 46). 
Family therapy was also tried, but was unsuccessful 
(Tr. p. 48). In short, as stated in the transcript, 
no other appropriate services were available in the 
juvenile system (Tr. p. SS). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS NOR DID THE JUVENILE 
COURT LACK JURISDICTION TO PROCEED 
AFTER APPELLANT WAS CERTIFIED. 
Appellant alleges a denial of due process but fails 
to show how such denial occured. It appears, however, 
1 refusal to review his that appellant feels the Court s 
initial appeal from the certification order was a 
h . h i'nvalidates all proceedings denial of due process w ic 
in the District Court. 
-3-
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The Juvenile Court ordered that the appellant, 
Aaron Lee Grueber, be certified to stand trial as 
an adult on June 9, 1977. (R. p. 8) Immediately 
thereafter, and prior to commencement of proceedings 
in the District Court, appellant appealed to this Court 
from the certification order (See Supreme Court 
Case No. 15322, July 1977). That appeal was dismissed 
on the court's own motion, on July 26, 1977. At that 
time this court did not interpret U.C.A. §78-3a-51 of 
the Juvenile Court Act to provide for a direct appeal 
from a certification order. State cou~ts across the 
country are divided almost equally on the issue of 
whether a certification is a final, appealable judgment, 
so Utah was certainly not alone in its practice of 
disallowing appeals until after the trial in the adult 
court. Furthermore, direct appeal from a certification 
order has never been held to be a constiutional right, 
denial of which would constitute a violation of due 
process. 
After the court's dismissal of his original appeal, 
appellant did not request a r~hearing or present any 
arguments to the court on the propriety of the dismissal. 
He was tried and convicted in the District Court and 
sentenced to a prison term. He has now been in prison 
-4-
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for over a year and complains that he is being subjected 
to the hardships of prison life because the court did 
not hear his original appeal and his certification was 
allowed to stand (Appellant's Brief, p. 3). However, 
it should be noted that appellant was convicted and 
sentenced in February, 1978. (R. p. 71). He filed his 
Notice of Appeal on March 24, 1978 (R. p. 72), and 
then extended his time for filing his brief for over a 
year. Thus, his prolonged stay at the prison can be 
attributed at least asmuch to his own delays as to the 
fact that his original certification appeal was not 
heard. 
In January, 1978, this court, upon rehearing in 
State in the Interest of Atcheson, 575 P. 2d 181 (Utah, 
1978) , decided that under the statutory language of U.C.A. 
78-3a-51, a certification order is a final, appealable 
order. This decision was based upon the wording of the 
Utah statute not on constitutional grounds. §78-3a-51 
U.C.A. 1953 provides in part: 
when a criminal complaint is filed in a court 
of competent jurisdiction charging ~he chi~d 
with the offense certified under this s~ction, 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is 
terminated as to the child or person concerned. 
-5-
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Based upon this Language, the court concluded: 
The fact that jurisdiction is specifically 
terminated by the statutory provisions at 
such time as a complaint is filed is clearly 
indicative of the finality of a certification 
order. From and after that time jurisdic-
tion is irrevocably transferred to the dis-
trict court. 575 p. 2d at 183. 
Thus, the right to appeal directly from a certification 
order is not a constitutional right, and appellant 
was not deprived of any due process protections when his 
appeal was dismissed. 
The Atcheson decision gives juveniles the option 
to appeal the certification order prior to commence-
ment of District Court proceedings, but it does not 
mandate that the appeal be taken at the time. A 
juvenile offender can still appeal the validity 
of a certification order after the trial in the district 
court, together with any issues raised in the trial. 
There is no authority in the Atcheson case or elsewhere 
for appellant's proposition that the District Court 
had no jurisdiction until after he had appealed the 
certification order. (Appellant's Brief, p. 4). Such 
a theory would invalidate every District Court proceeding 
which has taken place after certification if the 
juvenile did not appeal from the certification order 
prior to the District Court trial. This principle, as 
-6-
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espoused by appellant, ld · wou certianly provide a simple 
means of insuring that the District Court never had 
J·urisdiction to act. If 11 
, as appe ant alleges, the 
adult court does not have jurisdiction until the 
juvenile appeals his certification order, the juvenile 
could forever hold off the adult trial simply by never 
appealing from the certification order. 
It is true, as appellant alleges on page 4 of his 
brief, that the District Court does not obtain juris-
diction until after the Juvenile Court has made a full 
investigation and determination that certification would 
be in the best interests of the child. (Appellant's Brief 
p. 4). However, there is no basis in law for the 
proposition that the District Court does not obtain 
jurisdiction until after the juvenile appeals from the 
certification order. In this case, there was a full 
and complete investigation and hearing which led to the 
Juvenile Court's determination that certification was 
necessary and proper. If the certification is upheld 
by this Court, then the proceedings in the District 
Court must also be upheld, as appellant makes no challenges 
to his District court trial and conviction except the 
jurisdictionalchallenge discussed herein. Appellant's 
argument that even if this Court upholds the certifi-
-7-
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cation that all proceedings in the District Court 
should nevertheless be violated is untenable. Such 
a decision would render ineffective any trial court 
holding where the defendant juvenile had not appealed 
his certification order. Thus, any juvenile who was 
dissatisfied with his conviction or sentence in adult 
court couldrave it set aside on the ground that the 
District Court had no jurisdiction to act because 
there was no appeal from the certifiction order. 
Clearly, such was not the intent of this Court's 
decision in the Atcheson Case, supra, which allows 
a juvenile to appeal directly from a certification order, 
but does not require such an appeal before the District 
Court obtains jurisdiction. 
As is evident from the present appeal, the appellant 
has never been denied his right to appeal. He now has a 
full opportunity to have this Court consider any issues 
concerning his certification with which he takes 
exception. If this Court finds that the certification 
was improper, the appellant should be returned to the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court for whatever appro-
priate disposition remains available in the juvenile 
system. He should not simply be released as he proposes 
-8-
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(Appellant's Brief, p. 4). If the certification is 
upheld by this Court, the trial and conviction in 
the District Court remains valid, and appellant 
should continue to serve out his sentence. There 
would clearly be no reason to vacate all proceedings 
in the District Court as appellant suggests. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE ORDER FOR CERTIFic-_::oN WAS A 
REASOcJABLE EXERCISE O? ::scRETION 
BASED O~ SUBSTANTIAL E-::J3NCE. 
A. The certification ==ier of the Juvenile 
court should be Uf~sld if reasonable and 
supported by substa:-. ':ial evidence. 
This Court has consistently ~e.ld that certifi-
cation is a discretionary actio~, 3tate, In Interest 
of Salas, 520 P2d. 874 (Utah 19741, Atcheson, supra, 
and State, In InteJE&: of~, '.;:. 15557 (Utah, filed 
Sept. 21, 1978). The standard of =eview established 
by the Atcheson case and reaffir-:'."_s:: in Giron is that 
if the decision to certify is a "=e.asonable exercise 
of discretion" based upon "substa~=ial evidence," the 
order will be sustained, Atchesc~, supra, 575 B2d at 
183-184. This policy conforms ~i':i generally accepted 
standards of appellate review, es:;::-e.cially when the 
judgment appealed from was discre':ionary in nature. 
It is well settled that a j~igment of the trial 
court is presumed to be cor=s:': if there is 
reasonable evidence in the =s:ord to sustain 
it and the reviewing court -.. .-:.:.1 not substitute 
its discretion for that exe:ised by the trial 
court. Lancaster v. Chemi-::te Perlite Corp-
oration, 511 P. 2d 673, 676 _:c_riz. 1973). 
This court stated the same :;:::.icy in Bambrough v. 
Bethers, 552 P. 2d 1286, 1290 (C=s:-_, 1976): "The judg!:!ent 
-10-
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of the trial court will not be reversed unless it is 
shown that the discretion exercised therein has been 
abused." Therefore, under well-recognized rules of 
appellate review, the decision to certify in the present 
case must be affirmed absent a showing that the exercise 
of discretion by Judge Hermansen was unreasonable or 
not supported by substantial evidence. No such showing 
has been made by appellant in this case. 
B. The order of certification was based 
on substantial evidence. 
The criteria to be considered by the judge in a 
certification hearing were set out by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 
1045 (1966), and substantially adopted in Rule (7)7 of 
the Utah Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
The certificatimorder in the present case shows that 
these criteria were properly considered (R. p. 7-8). 
Moreover, as noted in the following analysis, there is 
substantial evidence supporting the judge's determin-
ation to certify appellant in ligh~ of ~hese criteria. 
Rule 7(7) sets out seven "factors which may bP 
consinered by the court in deciding whether the juvenile 
· · · - such offense will be waived." 
court's jurisdiction or 
Although these factors are only "guidelines" for certi-
-11-
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fication (Giron, su7ra, p. 3), ~t has been clearly 
established that w~en some or all of the criteria 
are met, certificat~on is proper. Atcheson, supra; 
In re Welfare of Hernandez, 548 P. 2d 340 (Wash. 1976). 
The following discussion analyzes the seven factors set 
out in Rule 7(7) as applicable to the facts and 
evidence presented ~n this case. 
(a) The seriocsness of the alleged offense to the 
community and whether the protection of the 
community requires certification. 
Appellant admits that one o= the crimes for which 
he was convicted, aqgravated robbery, is of a serious 
nature (Appellant's 3rief, p. 6). However, appellant 
fails to acknowledge the long list of crimes with which 
he was initially charged, and which the juvenile court 
judge had to consider at the time of the certification 
hearing. These charges included murder in the first 
degree, aggravated assault, five counts of aggravated 
robbery, three counts of aggravated burglary, and theft 
(see Petition, R. p. ::-6). Clearly, the argument that 
such offenses are nc~ serious car.not be maintained. 
Furthermore, t'r :> court :fbund that the protection of 
the community required certification (Certificatio~ Order 
R. p.7). This find~~g was directly supported by the 
testimony of two ex~ert witnesses (Tr. pp.78-79, 93) and 
-12-
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impliedly supported by the testi'mony of appellant's 
probation officer (Tr.p. 54-55). Th 
ere was no testimony 
that would support a contrary finding. 
(b) Whether the alleged offense was committed in 
an aggressive, violent, premeditated or 
willful manner. 
It would seem that after reading the list of 
charges in the petition, and the descriptions of the 
activities of appellant given by the witnesses, it 
would be difficult to allege that "There is no evidence 
that the robberies were committed in an aggressive or 
violent manner". However, just such an assertion is 
made by appellant herein (Appellant's Brief p.1). 
By their very definition, ten of the eleven offenses 
charged require some form of aggressiveness or violence. 
For example, a burglary becomes an aggravated buglary 
when the actor causes physical harm to another or 
threatens immediate use of a dangerous or deadly weapon 
against another U.C.A. §76-6-203. 
Judge Hermansen acknowledged this in his certifi-
cation order (R. p.7), and there is substantial evidence 
independent of the inherent characteristics of the 
h . f' d' The record shows that charges to support is in ing. 
appellant shot at a neighbor during one robbery (Tr. p.5, 
6,26) and made threats that amounted to violence in other 
-13-
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robberies ':r.411. The record also shows that one of 
these "non-~iole~t" incidents resulted in the death of 
the robbery victim. (Tr. 2 8) . Also, the psychologist 
who examinei apfellant testified that appellant has a 
potential for violence and could be dangerous (Tr.p.93). 
(c) w:-iethe::: the alleged offenseswas against 
f~rso~s or against property, greater weight 
.being given to offense against persons 
es?ecially if personal injury resulted. 
From t~e nature of the offenses charged, it is 
clear that ~he c:::imes committed were against both 
persons anc proferty. The judge also considered this 
factor as is clear from his order of certification 
where he Sfecifi::ally found,"Tnat the said alleged 
offenses were offenses against both persons and property• 
(R. p. 7). There can be no argument on this point and 
appellant kakes ~one. 
(d) The desirability of trial and misposition of the 
e~tire offense in one court when the juvenile's 
associates in the alleged offense are adults 
who wi 11 be charged with a crime in the District 
Court. 
While =.ppe::_:.ant feels that this factor is inap_::;licable 
in this ca5e, J~ige Hermansen ~isely found it to be a 
helpful co~sideration (R. p. 8). 
It is ~rue ~hat appellant's accomplice is not an 
adult, howe~er ~e was certified to stand trial in the 
-14-
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District Court as an adult (R. p. 8). Thus, the 
underlying consideration of factor (d) is applicable 
here and tends to favor certification. 
(e) ~he s~phisticatioh and the maturity of the 
Juvenile as determined by considerations 
of his home, environmental situation 
emotiona~ attitude, pattern of livin~, and 
alleged involvement in the offense. 
Although the certification order makes no mention 
of this guideline, the record contains evidence supportive 
of a finding that appellant is highly sophisticated. 
Appellant selected the sites for the crimes (Tr. 
p. 18), he planned them and made all the decisions 
(Tr. p. 20). Furthermore, appellant's own probation 
counselor recommended that certification take place 
specifically because appellant's high level of so-
histication required it (Tr. p. 54). 
(f) The record and previous history of the juvenile 
including previous contacts with law enforce-
ment agencies, juvenile courts and rehabili-
tative resources of the juvenile justice system 
and the success or failure of past corrective 
efforts in the juvenile system. 
In his certification order Judge Hermansen states: 
The court further notes that the said Aaron 
Lee Greuber has a rather lengthy past record 
of juvenile offenses of a serious nature 
and that the rehabilitative resources of the 
Juvenile Justice System have been ineffective 
in correcting the conduct and life style of 
this young man. (R. p. 8) 
-15-
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This find::::~ is more than adequately supported bi 
the evide:i.ce. ~ addition to the eleven offenses char;e~ 
in the origina: ?etition, appellant committed many otter 
violations, See Tr. p. 51-52 for a lenghty list, all of 
which were corrL-::.i tted during his second probation and 
therefore do nc-:: include the initial violations that 
placed ai:;?ella::-.-:: in the juvenile system, nor the re-
curring infractions that kept him there. 
As n.'.)ted :..::: the statement of facts, supra, the 
rehabilitative resources of the juvenile system had 
been virtually exhausted with absolutely no measure o= 
success. Appe::ant's probation counselor testified ttat 
appellant's pr:=ation was completely unsuccessful 
(Tr. p. 53). ~~e counselor's supervisor testified that 
no remedies available to the juvenile system would be 
adequate (Tr. --;. . 76-77). Appellant's examining psycholo<;::st 
also felt the ~~venile system was incapable of effective:v 
dealing with t~e problem (Tr. p. 89) and that, at any 
rate, ap?ella~-:: :acked the proper attitude for rehabi:i-
tation within -:::-.e time restraints of the juvenile sys-::e:::. 
(Tr. p. 100). 
The final ~~ideline for determination of the cer-::i£:-
cation is: 
-16-
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(g) The ~rospects for adequate protection of the 
public and the likelihood for reasonable 
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is 
found to have committed the alleged offense) 
by ~he use of procedures, services and facilities 
available under order of the juvenile court 
and whether the advantages and resources for 
treatment and public safety lie with the 
adult criminal court rather than the juvenile 
court. 
Judge Hermansen duly considered the relative merits 
of the rehabilitative resources of the two systems and 
concluded: 
That the prospects for adequate protection 
of the public and the likelihood for reasonable 
rehabilitation of this said juvenile if he 
is found to have committed the alleged 
offenses by use of procedures and services 
and facilities available under order of the 
Juvenile Court are inadequate and the public 
would be better served if this young man 
were certified for treatment and programming 
in the adult criminal system. (R. p. 8) 
A major concern on all the testifying experts 
was that appellant needed to be secuIEl.y confined 
for the protection of society (Tr. p. 54-55, 78-79, 
81, 93). Furthermore, both Atcheson, su?ra, 575 P. 2d 
at 184, and Giron, supra, at p. 2, have acknowledged 
that "The best interests of the public are equally as 
vital as those of the minor". In this case, when given 
equal consideration, the public concern for safety and 
security prevails against the appellants' interest in 
17-
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remaining in the juvenile system. T~is is partic~iarly 
true because of the testimony which s~ows that :.~a 
juvenile system is ineffective in re~abilitatin~ :~ 
treating the appellant. Thus, no sutstantial pu~~~se 
would be served in allowing appellant to stay ir. :.he 
juvenile system, but an important public purpose · .. :as 
served by transferring jurisdiction to the adul::. 
system which can afford the necessar:: security .... ·r,ile 
still providing some rehabilitative treatment. 
Therefore, because a certification crder is a ci~­
cretionary actic~ which in this case was based o~ 
substantial evidence, the decision o= the Juveni~a 
Court should be affir~ed and the certification u~~eld 
as valid. Each of the factors of Ru~e 7(7) were :onsidered 
by the juvenile court, and the evide~ce presentec with 
relation to said criteria supports t~e decision t: 
transfer jurisdiction to the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to ap~eal directly frc~ a certification 
order has been determined to exist i~ Utah by rea~on of 
the statutory language of U.C.A. §73-3a-51. Ho~aver, 
a juvenile is not com?elled to appea~ his certification 
prior to proceedings in adult court, and failu~a to do 
so has no effect upon the jurisdicticn of the D~s::.rict 
-18-
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:curt. A direct appeal from c. cert~fication order is 
nc~ a constitutionally protected ri;ht. Therefore, 
this Court's dismissal of appc:lant's original appeal 
did not violate any due process risits. It is well 
established that a judgment of the ~rial court is pre-
su.~ed to be correct if there is reasonable evidence in 
t~e record to sustain it. Atc~eson, supra, 575 P. 2d 
at 183. There is certainly rEasonajle evidence in the 
::-ecord to sustain the order mc..:.e by the juvenile court 
in the present case and no shc¥~ng :f abuse of discretion 
'."las or can be made. The appel:a'.1t -.. ;as afforded a full 
investigatim and a fair hearir_; on all matters relevant 
to the question of certificati c:-,. :'he evidence adduced 
at the hearing fully justifies the ~rder transferring 
jurisdiction in these circumst.ances. 
Therefore, the certification c::·der of the Juvenile 
Court and the conviction and sentence in the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
-19-
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